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CORRECTIVE TAXATION, LEVERAGE, AND
COMPENSATION IN A BLOATED FINANCIAL
SECTOR
Tim Edgar*
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 reinvigorated academic and
policymaking interest in the design of prudential regulatory regimes
governing the financial sector as a policy instrument intended to moderate
financial instability. The crisis also motivated interest in the role of taxation
as a complement to these regimes. Yet in practice, the use of tax
instruments has been modest. This article considers three tax instruments
that could serve this complementary role. Political economy considerations
aside, it is suggested that the use of bank leverage taxes by policymakers as
the tax instrument of choice is unsurprising. As recognized in the literature,
however, a corrective taxation case can be made for an increase in the rate
of such taxes as an instrument to eliminate the availability of cheap debt for
systemically important institutions. Although returns to risk taking is a
potentially robust tax base, the weak behavioral properties of this tax
instrument have apparently diminished its appeal for policymakers, while a
revenue-raising imperative that might otherwise motivate its adoption is
muted considerably by the adoption of a bank leverage tax. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, the tax literature does not consider the case for an
excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation as an instrument
to alter the structure of compensation. This may be attributable, in part at
least, to redundancy where regulatory regimes can be used to impose
constraints with similar intended effects.

'Osgoode Hall Law School, York University and Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. An
earlier version of this paper was prepared for Tax Policy for a Better Tomorrow:
Intersectoral and Multidisciplinary Connections, A Workshop in Honor of Neil Brooks
(Toronto, May 10-11, 2013).
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"'We have a social purpose.'... [I'm] just a banker 'doing God's
work.'"

"It's almost like these guys should have gotten the Nobel Prize for
evil. "2

I. INTRODUCTION
In terms of likely causes, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was not a
tax story. 3 Cleaning up the fiscal mess that is the result of the need to prop

1 John Arlidge, I'm Doing 'God's Work'. Meet Mr Goldman Sachs, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Nov. 8, 2009 (quoting Lloyd Blankfein, CEO and Chairman, Goldman Sachs).
2 Arthur Delaney, White House Adviser: AIG Deserves 'Nobel Prize for Evil',
HUFF[NGTON

POST

(Apr.

16,

2009,

6:12 AM),

/03/16/white-house-advisor-aig-d-n 175408.html
White House Council of Economic Advisers).

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009

(quoting Austen

Goolsbee, Member,

3 See TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 3 (Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi

eds., 2012). But see Ruud de Mooij et al., Taxation, Bank Leverage, and FinancialCrises
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up the financial sector in the wake of the crisis is a tax story, one part of
which is the use by some countries (most notably, France and the United
Kingdom) of temporary taxes on bonus compensation as a means to address
the perverse distributional result of the consequent income transfer.4
Another part of this post-crisis tax story emphasizes the potential for
corrective or Pigovian taxes to support prudential regulatory regimes as the
policy instrument of choice to realize a measure of financial stability.5 In
practice, however, the use of special taxes on the financial sector has been
very limited post crisis, with bank leverage taxes applied at relatively
modest rates as the instrument of choice. 6 Abstracting from the possible
effect of political economy considerations,7 it is suggested here that this
modest tax-policy action is unsurprising given the dominance of prudential
regulation.
More particularly, the article makes the following four points. First,
much of the post-crisis tax literature fails to clarify how the notion of a
corrective tax - in its conventionally understood sense in the public
finance literature as a tax designed to impose a cost equal to the social
marginal harm of an activity - can realize a result that is not already
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper, WP/13/48, 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wpl348.pdf (finding from bank panel data for the period 20012009 that there is a link between an increase in the probability of crisis and an increase in
bank leverage associated with a tax-debt bias); Martin A. Sullivan, Deleveraging the Tax
Code, 120 TAX NOTES 1241 (Sept. 29, 2008) (emphasizing a close link between interest
deductibility for income tax purposes and levels of leverage).
4 The U.K. bonus tax appears to have raised revenue three times greater than
expected, which may have been attributable to the grossing up of bonus pools in the presence
of the temporary tax. See Brooke Masters et al., Supertax Pulls in E2.5bnfor UK Treasury,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 4, 2010, at 1.
5 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, A FAIR AND SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION
BY THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, in FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION: THE IMF's REPORT TO THE G-20

AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 2, 9-11, 47-53 (Stijn Claessens et al. eds., 2010).

6 The Financial Crisis Responsibility (FCR) fee, proposed by President Barack
Obama's administration, is an example of a bank leverage tax applicable to the principal
amount of uninsured or wholesale liabilities of financial institutions with assets in excess of
$50 billion. The FCR fee was initially proposed in January 2010 and was included as a
proposed measure in the Administration's fiscal year 2014 budget. See DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE

PROPOSALS

149-50 (2013). Several European Union member states have adopted

comparable taxes. See EUROPEAN COMM., CONCLUSIONS OF THE 17 JUNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

6 (2010); Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi, Introduction to TAXATION AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 3, at 1, 13-14; Thornton Matheson, FinancialSector Taxation
and the Ongoing Financial Crisis, in TAXING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: FINANCIAL TAXES,
BANK LEVIES AND MORE 203, 205-09 (Otto Mares & Dennis Weber eds., 2012).
7 See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK,
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010).

13 BANKERS:

THE WALL STREET
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realized by prudential regulatory regimes. 8 Second, the redundancy of
corrective taxation in its conventionally understood sense leaves a bank
leverage tax on uninsured or wholesale liabilities as an attractive instrument
to perform a clearly specified revenue-raising function with behavioral
properties that can be seen to support prudential regulatory regimes. Third,
taxation of returns to risk taking in the financial sector has not had any
policy traction, 9 primarily because of its weak behavioral properties and an
incomplete revenue-raising role in the presence of a bank leverage tax.
Fourth, an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation in the
financial sector can be justified as a policy instrument intended to induce a
narrowly defined behavioral response.
Parts II and III review, respectively, the related roles of leverage and
compensation in the financial sector as sources of risk taking and financial
instability. Part II begins with a brief account of Hyman Minsky's
"financial instability hypothesis,"' 0 which describes the build up of
excessive leverage and risk taking through the business cycle as the sources
of financial instability that are endemic to a sophisticated market economy
with financial intermediation. This is followed by a description in Part III of
Paul Woolley's agency explanation of the asset mispricing Minsky
identified as a source of the kind of system-wide risk that can precipitate a
crisis." The role of compensation structures in the financial sector is
highlighted as an important factor that amplifies the effects of Woolley's
agency story.
8 A notable exception is Michael Keen, Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial
Sector, 57 CESIFo ECON. STUD. 1, 10-20 (2011); see also Douglas A. Shackelford et al.,
Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 781 (2010) (discussing the theory and
design of corrective taxes as applied to the financial sector); Joel B. Slemrod, Lessons for
Tax Policy in the Great Recession, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 389 (2009) (suggesting that some
insight may be gained from applying the economics of Pigovian taxes to address systemic
risk); Michael P. Devereux, New Bank Taxes: Why and What Will Be the Effect? 17-20
(Apr. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.etpf.org/papers/64bank.
pdf (describing choice of taxation or regulation of the financial sector "[s]tarting with a
blank sheet of paper .... ").
9 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 19-23, 65-69; Michael
Keen et al., The FinancialActivities Tax, in FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION, supra note 5, at

118.
10 Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is articulated most completely in
HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986). With the first edition out of

print, recent interest in Minsky's ideas led to publication of a second edition, posthumously,
under the guidance of Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray, two former colleagues
of Minsky's at the Levy Economics Institute. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN
UNSTABLE ECONOMY (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008)].
II

See Paul Woolley, Why Are Financial Markets So Inefficient and Exploitative -

and a Suggested Remedy, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE: THE LSE REPORT 121 (2010); see also
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Part IV examines the role of special taxes on the financial sector as a
complement to prudential regulation in suppressing the sources of financial
instability reviewed in Parts II and III. It is suggested that the use of bank
leverage taxes, as the apparent tax instrument of choice to suppress the use
of debt, could be designed more expansively to both generate revenue
sufficient to cover the expected direct costs of future bailouts and to
eliminate the borrowing subsidy attributable to implicit government support
for systemically important institutions that are considered "too-big-to-fail"
(TBTF). The case for a bank leverage tax to serve these two roles appears to
weaken the case for taxation of returns to risk taking in the financial sector.
Nevertheless, its design features highlight the fact that an excise tax
intended to alter the structure of bonus and performance-based
compensation can fill a gap in prudential regulatory regimes. It is not clear,
however, that this tax instrument should be preferred over a regulatory
response. 12
II. THE SOCIAL PURPOSE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND LEVERAGE AS
AN INSTRUMENT OF EVIL: MINSKY'S FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS
The social purpose of the financial sector, which Lloyd Blankfein
infamously referred to as "God's work," is conventionally categorized in
terms of the following general functions1 3:
* the provision of payment services;
*

the provision of insurance in the form of risk pooling;

*

the making of markets in assets, both spot and forward; and

* the intermediation of funds between providers (that is, savers and
investors) and users (that is, all borrowers and businesses raising equity
capital).
Financial instability tends to arise from a combination of asset
mispricing and the use of leverage by the financial sector in performing the
functions within the third and fourth categories, with the latter category
extending to the provision of maturity and risk/return transformation. Used

Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, An InstitutionalTheory of Momentum and Reversal, 26
REv. FIN. STUD. 5, 1087 (2013).

12 See, e.g., Martin Wolf, Why and How Should We Regulate Pay in the Financial
Sector?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note 11, at 235.
13 See Adair Turner, What Do Banks Do? Why Do Credit Booms and Busts Occur?
What Can Public Policy Do About It?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note 11, at 10.
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in moderation, leverage is an instrument of good in performing these
necessary functions. Used excessively, leverage is an instrument of evil as it
fuels asset price increases through a price bubble. The inevitable price
correction can "blow a hole" in the balance sheet of financial institutions
and in extreme circumstances can result in a financial crisis.
The instability-breeding dynamics associated with the combination of
asset mispricing and leverage is described by Minsky's "financial instability
hypothesis." 1 4 At the macro level, Minsky illustrates how aggregate profits
for each period equal aggregate investment and depend on aggregate
spending on investment.15 At a micro level, he argues that firms must be
able to realize a markup over labor costs and will pursue market power to
achieve such ends. Prices, therefore, have five discrete functions1 6
* to ensure that a surplus is generated;
*

to ensure that some of the surplus accrues to business owners;

* to ensure that the demand price of capital assets is consistent with
the supply price;
*

to ensure that debt finance commitments can be satisfied; and

*

to ensure that resources are allocated to the investment sector.

In a capitalist economy, these functions are discharged in the form of
two sets of prices: one for current output and one for capital assets." The
price of current output depends on short-run expectations of demand and
wage rates. Spending on investment depends on the demand price and the
14 Hyman P. Minsky, The FinancialInstability Hypothesis 1, 6 (Jerome Levy Econ.
Inst., Working Paper No. 74, 1992) ("The financial instability hypothesis ... is a theory of
the impact of debt on system behavior and also incorporates the manner in which debt is
validated.").
15 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 157-90. The aggregate amount of
profits equals the sum of investment plus consumption out of profits plus the government's
deficit and any trade surplus, less savings out of wages. In a simplified model without
government deficits, balanced trade, and no savings out of wages, profits equal investment
(plus consumption by capitalists, which is negligible). See, e.g., Elisabetta De Antoni, The
(Too?) Optimistic 'Financial Keynesianism' of Hyman Minsky 5-13 (2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ius.unicas.it/mc2005/papers/deantoni.pdf; see also Janelia
Tse, Minsky's FinancialInstability Hypothesis, 4 OECONOMIcus 77, 79-80 (2001); Dimitri
B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky's Analysis of Financial Capitalism 6-9
(Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 275, 1999).
16 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 157-90; see also Tse, supra note
15,
at 79.
1

Tse, supra note 15, at 79.
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supply price of capital assets. The latter is a function of the costs of
production, which consist primarily of purchase price (costs of labor plus a
markup) and financing costs. The former is a function of expectations about
future profits.
Investment thereby links the price of capital assets with the price of
current production. The uncertainty associated with expectations of future
profits and the financing of capital assets with debt, however, make the
economy unstable. Expectations of profits depend on future investment,
with realized profits determined by investment. Financial institutions are
the critical actors in this process: they receive savings from households,
which are then provided to businesses for production, with a reverse flow of
funds moving from businesses to households. The flow of money to
businesses occurs as a response to expectations of future profits, while the
flow of money from businesses is financed by realized profits. Expectations
of profits determine the flow of financing contracts to businesses and the
value of those contracts, with the past, present, and future linked by these
financial relations. Minsky's description of financial relations is not limited,
however, to businesses; it extends to households and governments by way
of their ability to borrow on the basis of expectations of future cash flows.18
These essential features of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis are
captured in his two theorems. The first theorem holds that the character of
the financial relations predominating at any time in an economy determines
its financial stability.19 In this respect, Minsky describes three states of
financial relations characteristic of economic units: hedge finance,
speculative finance, and Ponzi finance. A hedge finance unit is
characterized by an ability to fulfill payment commitments with realized
cash flows. Because equity finance provides a margin of safety in the event
that realized profits are less than payment commitments under debt
contracts, economic units with greater weighted levels of equity finance
will tend to be hedge finance units. A speculative finance unit is one that
can meet its interest and similar income account commitments as they fall
due, but cannot repay the amount of its principal repayment obligations and

Minsky's leverage story extends to an open-economy setting when businesses,
households, and governments borrow internationally. Minsky, supra note 14, at 4-5; see also
Philip Arestis & Murray Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion
the Minskyan Way, 26 CAMBRIDGE. J. ECON. 237, 237 (2002) (arguing that the sources of
instability Minsky identified are intensified in an open-economy setting); Jan Kregel,
Managing the Impact of Volatility in International CapitalMarkets in an Uncertain World 4
(Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 558, 2009) (describing the transmission of
financial instability through international capital flows and risk-management techniques of
multinational banks).
19 Minsky, supra note 14, at 7-8.
18
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must roll over or refinance its liabilities on maturity. A Ponzi finance unit is
one that cannot fulfill its obligations to pay interest or principal as they
become due and must borrow against rising asset prices or sell assets to
meet these commitments.
Minsky's second theorem holds that capitalist economies tend to move
from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance to a structure
dominated by speculative and Ponzi finance during periods of prolonged
prosperity. 20 The transition occurs as realized profits continue to validate
debt, which increases expectations of future profit levels and investment
financed by greater levels of debt. 2 1 Financial institutions are supposed to
function as skeptics and dampen the excessive enthusiasm, so that realized
profits are more likely to be sufficient to fulfill commitments. As Minsky
emphasizes, however, financial institutions are profit-seeking enterprises
that innovate in their acquisition of assets and marketing of liabilities as
"merchants of debt" 22 and, in the process, tend to fuel the transition to
speculative and Ponzi finance during periods of prolonged prosperity. An
ostensibly stable economy is essentially destabilized by its tranquility, as
past success leads to expanding credit and the assumption of riskier
positions. 23 The inevitable asset price correction can precipitate a "Minsky
Id. John Geanakoplos describes much the same process as the "leverage cycle." See,
e.g., John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 2 (Cowles Found. for Research in Econ.,
Discussion Paper No. 1715, 2009), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/-gean/art/
pl304.pdf.
21 This process is famously captured by the label "irrational exuberance," which Alan
Greenspan used when he was chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank in a dinner speech to
describe the stock market bubble in the mid-1990s. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed.
Reserve Bank, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a
Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/1996/19961205.htm. The label was arguably made that much more famous when
Robert Shiller subsequently used it as the title of his book describing the same asset price
bubble. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 3 (1st ed. 2000).
22 Minsky, supra note 14, at 6 ("Thus, bankers ... are merchants of debt who strive to
innovate in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market.").
20

23 See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT

CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); see also Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for

Int'l Settlements (BIS), Panel Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Economic Policy Symposium: International Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Making
the Macroprudential
Approach Operational
(Aug. 21,
2009), available at
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/Caruana.09.11.09.pdf (emphasizing the
feedback effects of credit extension, leverage, risk perceptions and risk appetite, asset prices,
and economic activity, which together can make the financial system more complex and
characterized by nonlinear dynamics); Geanakoplos, supra note 20, at 16 (emphasizing the
significance of reductions in collateral requirements during periods of prosperity which are
then increased in a debt deflationary environment).
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moment," 24 characterized by the ensuing debt deflation as financial
institutions call in debts and tighten the provision of new credit, while
borrowers, which include financial institutions, must sell assets to fulfill
payment commitments. 25 In the extreme, hedge finance units become
speculative units, speculative units become Ponzi units, and Ponzi units see
their net wealth disappear.
Minsky's principal point of departure with neoclassical economic
theory is the fact that he takes seriously the financial intermediation
function, which he refers to generically as "banking." 26 The dynamics of
the financing function, which Minsky describes as the source of financial
instability, do not depend on a premise of irrationality on the part of
investors along any behavioral margin. 27 Minsky's challenge to neoclassical
orthodoxy can therefore be characterized as fundamental, distinguishing the
market for consumer goods and services from the market for financial
assets. The pricing mechanism of the former operates to allocate resources.
Increased demand for an item triggers an increase in supply while a
decrease in demand triggers a decrease in supply, with changes in price
equating demand and supply such that markets clear. Because of this
process, the market for consumer goods and services is equilibrium seeking
and vulnerable only to external shocks. The market for financial assets is
much different in that it is characterized by the search for scarcity value in
an environment in which supply does not respond completely to changes in
price.28 An increase in price can stimulate increased demand without a
24 Minksy never used the term "Minsky moment" to describe the downward shift in a
business cycle with the ensuing necessity to sell assets to meet payment commitments. The
term was apparently coined by a bond fund director, Paul McCulley, during the Russian debt
crisis. See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency - Mr.
Minsky Long Argued Markets Were Crisis-Prone;His 'Moment' Has Arrived, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 2007, at Al.
25 See, e.g., E. Philip Davis & Mark R. Stone, Corporate Financial Structure and
FinancialStability, I J. FIN. STABILITY 65 (2004) (finding that the debt-equity ratios of firms
are correlated with investment and inventory declines following crises). The process of debt
deflation was first described by Irving Fisher, The Debt Deflation Theory of Great
Depressions, I ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933).
26 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 173 ("In today's standard economic

theory, an abstract non-financial economy is analyzed. Theorems about this abstract
economy are assumed to be essentially valid for economies with complex financial and
monetary institutions and usages. This logical jump is an act of faith . . . ."); see also
Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 15, at 4-6 (describing the assumptions underlying the
orthodox microeconomic and macroeconomic models Minsky criticized).
27 See Geanakoplos, supra note 20, at 3 ("But a crucial part of my leverage cycle story
is that every agent is acting perfectly rationally from his own individual point of view.").
28

GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT

BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 7-8 (2008). But see RICHARD BOOKSTABER,
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corresponding increase in supply, while a decrease in price can cause a
decrease in demand without a contraction of supply. In this type of market,
it is the rate of price change that affects demand, rather than price change
itself.29 Such a market is not equilibrium seeking: it is inherently unstable
and, in the presence of excessive leverage, it is fragile.
Descriptively at least, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis
captures the instability-breeding dynamics evident in financial crises;
however, an observed shortcoming of Minsky's story is a failure to posit a
micro foundation that can explain the source of asset mispricing that, when
combined with leverage, lies at the heart of financial instability. As
described in the next part, an agency explanation of asset mispricing that
focuses on the financial intermediation function can fill this gap.
III. AN AGENCY THEORY OF ASSET MISPRICING, RENT EXTRACTION, AND
WINNER-TAKE-ALL FEATURES OF THE LABOR MARKET IN THE FINANCIAL

SECTOR

Two prominent features marked the build up to the financial crisis of
2007-2009. The first is the increasingly disproportionate size of the
financial sector relative to the rest of the economy, particularly in the
United Kingdom and the United States. 30 The second is the increasingly
disproportionate levels of compensation in the financial sector labor market
as compared to the labor market generally. 3 1 This outsized growth was not
necessarily accompanied by a proportionate increase in the value added that
the financial sector delivered.3 2 Indeed, much of the growth may be
DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL

INNOVATION 213-20 (2007) (emphasizing demand and supply of liquidity as the principal
driver of price movements rather than the revelation of information).
29 COOPER, supra note 28, at 8; see also Jack Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market
Bubbles, 54 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 69 (1998) (arguing that investors' different views mean that
there are winners and losers as prices change in response to new information, with the
resulting wealth effect creating a new equilibrium and wealth shift that can cause greater
subsequent price changes).
30 See Turner, supra note 13, at 13-30 (describing various dimensions indicative of the
financial sector's increased scale of operations relative to the rest of the economy occurring
over the thirty to forty years preceding the financial crisis).
31 See, e.g., Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
FinancialIndustry 1909-2006 (Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14644, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1329262 (finding that compensation in the financial
sector was excessively high around 1930 and from the mid-1990s until 2006).
32 See Andrew Haldane et al., What Is the Contribution of the Financial Sector:
Miracle or Mirage?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note I1, at 64 (finding that a detailed
decomposition of returns to banking suggest that much of the increase in measured GDP
contribution of the financial sector reflected returns to higher risk taking); see also Turner,
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attributable to increasingly destructive rent-seeking behavior; 33 behavior
Paul Woolley argues is the source of the inherent instability Minsky
describes. 34
Woolley's critical premise is that asset prices are set, not by end
investors or the representative household, but rather by their agents in the
financial sector (banks, fund managers, and broker-dealers). This premise
sets up a standard agency problem of information asymmetry in which the
agents have more and better information than their principals but hold
divergent interests. Because of the information asymmetry, principals
cannot distinguish competent and diligent agents from incompetent and
shirking agents as determined by performance benchmarks. In particular,
principals cannot determine whether underperformance is attributable to
incompetence or to the prudent avoidance of overpriced assets. When
underperformance persists, principals shift their funds to outperforming
agents, which generates and reinforces price momentum. In this respect,
Woolley's agency story is the mechanism by which asset pricing is the
outcome of the well-recognized battle between "fair value and
momentum." 35
supra note 13, at 30-40 (suggesting that the value added by credit intermediation depends on
the social function of different categories of credit intermediation, while the provision of
liquidity to asset markets through position taking is valuable up to a point but not beyond);
Thomas Philippon, Has the US. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? (N.Y. Univ.,
Working Paper No. FIN-l1-037, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1972808
(finding that: (1) improvements in information technologies of the past 30 years have not
resulted in a decrease in the annual unit cost of financial intermediation, which has remained
stable over time at around 2 percent of outstanding assets; and (2) financial services are
produced under constant returns to scale); Jennie Bai et al., Have FinancialMarkets Become
More Informative? (Nov. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2175112 (finding that the information content of market
prices for equities and bonds in the United States has not increased despite increased trading
activity).
33 See, e.g., FIN. SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 49 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner-review.pdf (suggesting that much of the structuring
and trading activities involved in securitized credit was not required to deliver credit
intermediation efficiently, but instead achieved rent extraction made possible by (1) the
opacity of margins; (2) the asymmetry of information and knowledge between end users of
financial services and producers; and (3) the structure of principal-agent relationships
between investors and companies and between companies and individual employees); see
also Philippon & Reshef, supra note 3 1, at 30 (estimating that rent extraction accounted for
thirty to fifty percent of the wage differential between the financial sector and the rest of the
economy observed over the ten years preceding the financial crisis).
34 See Woolley, supranote I1; Vayanos & Woolley, supra note 11.
3

Woolley, supra note 11, at 126; see also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How

HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 122 (2010) (observing that
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Woolley also argues that his agency story explains the extraction of
progressively higher rents by the financial sector. What is important here is
the recognition that information asymmetries explain the increasing, yet
ultimately unsustainable, size of rents. Such rents are contrasted with the
usual form of sustainable rents commonly attributed to exploitation of
market power. This proposition is presented in a formal dynamic rational
expectations model showing the evolution of a financial innovation.3 6 The
key features of the model are uncertainty, learning, and information
asymmetry which together generate initial growth, followed by the
extraction of progressively higher rents and fat tails in the distribution of
aggregate defaults and endogenous crisis. Agents must distinguish between
robust and fragile financial innovations. Default risk with the former is low
while default risk with the latter is high. In the presence of uncertainty,
agents learn progressively about an innovation by observing profits derived
from its adoption. High profits result in increased adoption and confidence
that an innovation is, in fact, robust. Provided that information is symmetric
for principals and agents, an increase in the scale of adoption of an
innovation leads to increased compensation for agents; however, gains are
competitively determined at normal levels (that is, an absence of rents), and
therefore a robust innovation flourishes. On the other hand, fragility leads to
deteriorating profits, and an innovation is abandoned. Crises do not occur.
In the presence of information asymmetries, agents have an incentive
to shirk in their assessment of an innovation as fragile or robust that is
exacerbated by payoff profiles allowing agents to share in gains but avoid
losses. Principals must reward agents to address shirking but at the cost of
the greater moral hazard associated with the consequent payoff profiles that
result in progressively higher rent extraction. Woolley's model shows that
the probability of shirking is higher when an innovation is robust. After a
period of consistently high profits, agents become confident that an
innovation is robust, and the incentive to shirk increases such that principals
must pay more to induce effort while agents capture most of the gains. An
otherwise robust innovation ultimately collapses as principals become
frustrated with increasingly poor returns. Alternatively, the fragility of an
innovation is revealed in the presence of asset mispricing, and an otherwise
fragile innovation also collapses. Principal-agent information asymmetry is
banker behavior tends to be self-reinforcing and can exaggerate investment trends, moving
prices far away from fundamentals); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises,
I 10 EcoN. J. 236, 239 (2000) (constructing a simple model in which agency problems
associated with leveraged investment in risky assets cause those assets to be priced above
their fundamental value in the context of a credit expansion).
36 See Bruno Blais et al., Innovations, Rents and Risk (De Nederlandsche Bank
Working Paper No. 356, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2171740.
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thus posited as "responsible for creating the twin social bads [sic] of
mispricing and rent capture."3 7 Mispricing causes price swings that are at
the heart of financial instability. Rent capture causes the misallocation of
labor and capital, with significant wealth transfers to the financial sector
that can also induce systemic failure on the collapse of an innovation.38
Increasing levels of rent capture and increasing susceptibility to crisis
are the two principal predictions of Woolley's agency story that he claims
are consistent with the empirical evidence. 3 9 He fails to incorporate,
however, the possible sources for the innovation that is posited as the driver
of his agency theory of asset mispricing and rent capture that, because of
standard problems of opacity and moral hazard, destabilize the economy
through the financial sector. In this respect, explanatory power may be
found in the observation that the labor market in the financial sector has, in
the past several decades, come to exhibit features characteristic of what
Robert Frank and Philip Cook characterize as "winner-take-all markets." As
Frank and Cook describe in their popular book, The Winner-Take-All
Society,4 0 these kinds of labor markets are characterized by the
determination of payoffs by relative rather than (or in addition to) absolute
performance;41 another feature of these labor markets is that rewards tend to
be captured by a small proportion of individuals. Small differences in
abilities end up being associated with disproportionate differences in
compensation levels. 42
Frank and Cook divide winner-take-all labor markets into two types.
They label one type "mass markets," in which disproportionate rewards are
available because a multitude of buyers each have a small interest in the
winner's performance. 4 3 They label the other type of winner-take-all market
"deep pocket markets," in which disproportionate rewards are available
because a small number of buyers are intensely interested in the winner's
performance. 44 The pattern of rewards characteristic of a winner-take-all
labor market arguably tends to appear in the financial sector as a deep
pocket market associated most strongly with investment banking, asset

n Woolley, supra note 11, at 131.
38 Id. at 131 (arguing that mispricing and rent capture create "a perfect storm of wealth
destruction").
39 Id. at 130-31 (citing Philippon & Resheff, supra note 31).
40 ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE
FEW AT THE ToP GET So MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF Us (1995).
41 Id. at 24.
42 Id.

43 Id. at 26 (citing as examples the markets for athletes and entertainers).
4 Id. (citing as examples the markets for painters, sculptors, and lawyers).
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management, and securitization.4 5 Although Frank and Cook identify
various sources of winner-take-all markets and various factors driving the
growth of such markets, 46 the following four features of the labor market in
the financial sector stand out:
* technological innovation;
*

deregulation;

*

decision leverage; and

*

wealth concentration.

The adoption by the financial sector of sophisticated risk-management
strategies is a familiar story 47 that coincided with a movement to lighter
regulation of the regulated part of the financial sector and a movement into
unregulated shadow banks, securitization structures, hedge funds and
private equity. These two trends fueled competition for talent that included
an influx of engineers, physicists, mathematicians, and business school
graduates to the financial sector.4 8 The competition for talent to create and
refine innovations provided decision leverage to labor below the executive
level: that is, decisions made by a particular employee acquired the ability
to significantly affect the outcomes of an organization. All of these factors
could be seen in the increasingly higher levels of compensation paid to
successful traders in financial firms. Growing levels of wealth concentration
have also provided concentrated purchasing power seeking the best asset
management talent often found in hedge funds and private equity firms that

45 See RAJAN, supra note 35, at 123-29 (emphasizing use of money to measure

performance in the financial sector and the lack of any other factor as a measure of worth).
46 FRANK & COOK, supra note 40, at 32-44, 45-60.
47 For accessible and entertaining accounts of the development of financial theory, see
PETER L. BERSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1996); PETER L.
BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET (1992);
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING (2007).
48 See Philippon & Reshef, supra note 31 (finding that financial deregulation and
corporate activities linked to initial public offerings and credit risk increased the demand for
skills in financial jobs that were relatively skill intensive, complex, and highly paid until the
1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim period); see also Joshua N. Ruah & Steven
N. Kaplan, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to the Rise in Highest Incomes?
(Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 13270, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-931280 (suggesting that theories of skill-biased technological
change, superstars, and greater scale explain the increased percentage representation of
financial sector employees (from investment banks, hedge funds, private equity firms, and
mutual funds) in the adjusted gross income categories at or above the top 0.1 percent).
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seamlessly compete for talent developed in investment banks. 4 9
Arguably, these kinds of factors have driven the genesis and growth of
winner-take-all labor markets in the financial sector, which then adopted the
standard payoff profiles seen in other winner-take-all labor markets. More
particularly, performance as the basis of different levels of compensation
can be readily measured. Moreover, the gains from successful performance
can be scaled: that is, nonlinear returns can be generated from a given level
of investment of human capital. The financial sector especially lends itself
to scalable returns because of the limitless supply of financial products in
response to demand. The financial sector thus became characterized by the
chase for returns in excess of those provided by holding a benchmark
market index that reflects systemic or "beta risk." The value added provided
by the asset manager (the agent in Woolley's agency story) is seen to
generate the excess return referred to as "alpha" for which investors will
pay a premium. Woolley's robust versus fragile innovations can be seen as
strategies employed by asset managers to generate alpha.50 As Raghuram
Rajan notes, 51 there are, however, limited sources of alpha. One source is
genuine abilities to consistently identify underpriced assets as a "valueinvesting" strategy, but agents/asset managers with these abilities are rare.
Another source is from activist investment commonly associated with
venture capital and private equity funds that acquire a controlling interest
and manage assets in a more effective manner. A third source is the
financial innovation Woolley identifies in creating cash flows and
associated securities that are new and thereby complete markets by
providing investors with novel payoff profiles.
Rajan emphasizes that generating sustainable alpha is difficult because
of the requirement of special abilities and constant innovation. 52 "False
alpha" arises in the form of what appears to be excess returns associated
with a steady stream of payoffs that can be reversed on the occurrence of a
"tail risk" event resulting in a rare but disproportionate negative return.
Given limited liability in the event of loss, the financial sector can engage
in the chase for false alpha by adopting asymmetric bets using leverage that

49 See, e.g., RAJAN, supra note 35, at 132 ("[T]here are enormous risks in bringing
together deep-pocketed investors who are not adequately conscious of prices and risks, and
the highly motivated private financial sector.").
5o See, e.g., PHILIP AUGAR, CHASING ALPHA: How RECKLESS GROWTH AND
UNCHECKED AMBITION RUINED THE CITY'S GOLDEN DECADE (2009).
51 Raghuram Rajan, Bankers' Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9,
2008, at 15; see also RAJAN, supra note 35, at 134-53; Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking
Compensation in FinancialFirms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How To REPAIR A
FAILED SYSTEM 187, 203-06 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).

52 Rajan, supra note 51.
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has manifested itself in a series of financial crises from the 1980s,
culminating in the crisis of 2007-2009 centered in the U.S. mortgage
market. As the latest crisis revealed, sustainable and genuine alpha can be
measured only in the long term, with false alpha arising in the short to
medium term. This fact is significant for the structuring of compensation in
the financial sector. 53 As emphasized in the next part, a line of argument
that borrows loosely from the conceptual foundations of corrective taxation
can support an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation,
as well as a bank leverage tax, as instruments intended to suppress the
instability-breeding dynamics of financial markets.
IV. CORRECTIVE TAXATION AND THE POLICY CASE FOR SPECIAL TAXES
ON THE FINANCIAL SECTOR

The post-crisis tax literature tends to emphasize the following
justifications for special taxes on the financial sector 54 :
* as a corrective tax intended to impose a marginal cost on the
financial sector equal to the marginal social harm attributable to
excessive risk taking;
*

as a risk-based charge intended to function as an insurance levy; or

* as a revenue source intended to require the financial sector to pay
for some portion of the costs of bailouts.
In this part, I argue that the first and second justifications are
problematic: the first because of redundancy with prudential regulatory
regimes, and the second because of costing issues. Nonetheless, a bank
leverage tax, which has been adopted by a number of countries post crisis,
can be justified as an instrument to both require the financial sector to pay
the direct fiscal costs of bailouts and to eliminate the TBTF borrowing
subsidy. A decidedly secondary, but desirable, effect of this tax base is a
possible reduction of risk taking associated with a reduction of leverage
attributable to a tax-price increase. As proposed in some of the tax
literature, 55 the case for adoption of standard measures of returns to risk-

5

Id.

54 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5; Keen, supra note 8; see also

Devereux, supra note 8, at 13-23 (distinguishing between taxes on the financial sector that
are intended to raise revenue and those same taxes that are intended to influence behavior).
5

See INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that a "financial

activities tax" (FAT) could raise significant revenue and be designed to serve a range of
purposes).
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taking in the context of income and consumption tax bases as the base for a
special tax on the financial sector must be grounded primarily on the third
justification. Any behavioral response to this tax base is likely weak,
particularly as compared to a bank leverage tax. An excise tax on bonus and
performance-based compensation in the financial sector can be justified as a
policy instrument intended to alter the structure of such compensation and
associated risk taking, but is redundant where regulatory regimes impose
requirements with similar intended effects. In that case, this tax base must
also be rooted in the third justification noted above.
A. PrudentialRegulation as the Policy Instrument of Choice Intended to
Moderate FinancialInstability
Parts II and III described the destabilizing effect of the use of leverage
combined with asset mispricing in the financial sector and the winner-takeall features of the labor market in this sector that can amplify both in the
context of a standard principal-agent problem. Such instability, which is
endogenous to the financial sector and thus sophisticated capitalist
economies reliant on a robust financial function, requires a regulatory
response in the presence of social costs imposed by the insolvency of
financial institutions. The case for regulation is thus a standard one that
requires government intervention in the market whenever particular
activities in production or consumption impose costs on third parties
(referred to as "negative spillovers" or "negative externalities"). Even in the
presence of asset mispricing, no such externalities would arise if all
financial institutions were entirely equity-financed in performing their
necessary functions, or if equity holders had unlimited liability and
sufficient assets to satisfy the liabilities of their leveraged firms. Under such
conditions, all costs of insolvency would be internalized as private marginal
costs of the equity holders. 5 6 As capitalist economies have grown and
become more sophisticated, however, these conditions have been viewed as
excessively constraining on the performance of the financial sector's
functions.
Limited liability of equity holders means that the combination of
leverage and asset mispricing are destabilizing with consequent social costs
of insolvency. As described by Charles Goodhart, there are five separate
56

FUTURE
5

See Charles Goodhart, How Should We Regulate the Financial Sector?, in
OF FINANCE, supra note 11, at 153, 159.

THE

See INT'L MONETARY FUND, DEBT BIAS AND OTHER DISTORTIONS: CRISIS-RELATED

12 (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.imf org/external/np/pp/
eng/2009/061209.pdf (characterizing excessive leverage as a negative externality that is not
captured by micro-economic models focused on the level of firm-specific borrowing as a
ISSUES IN TAX POLICY
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sets of such costs:
* direct costs of the use of resources to wind up a firm;
* potential dislocation of financial markets and settlement/payment
systems;
*

loss of specialized skills/information of employees of the firm;

*

uncertainty and potential loss for all counterparties of the firm; and

* loss of unused credit facilities with loss of potential access to
money.
In the event of a crisis precipitated by the contemporaneous failure of
multiple institutions, 59 social costs extend to include 60 : (1) deadweight
losses from fiscal transfers; and (2) output losses, including increases in
unemployment.
The most significant location of instability with the largest potential
social costs is the performance of the credit intermediation function,
primarily in the form of 6 1: (1) maturity transformation in which financial
institutions lend funds at longer average maturities than they borrow funds;
and (2) risk-return transformation using the liabilities of borrowers to create
a different mix of debt and equity investment options for savers. Although
instability can also be associated with the market-making function, 62 it
tends to be more prominent and threatening in the case of maturity and riskreturn transformation because the dominant portion of the assets and
liabilities of large and systemically important financial institutions are
devoted to these functions. As a result, "the hole in the balance sheet" that
can occur because of an asset price correction can be especially severe. The
standard pattern of prudential regulation intended to maintain firm and
sector-wide stability focuses on the performance of these functions. Indeed,
a prominent feature of the latest financial crisis was the fact that it was
precipitated by problems in traditional investment banks that were

function of the internalization of bankruptcy costs).
58 Goodhart, supra note 56, at
158.
B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON'T SEE
171 (2012) (defining a financial crisis as the exhaustion of the entire capital
of the banking system or evidence of significant problems in the banking system).
59 See GARY

THEM COMING
60 Id.

Turner, supra note 13, at 9-11.
Id. at 59 (observing that losses incurred in trading activities can generate confidence
collapses, which can constrain credit supply and necessitate public rescue in extreme cases).
61

62
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essentially performing the maturity and risk-return transformation function
through securitization of subprime mortgages, but were not formally within
the regulatory regime applicable to this function. 63
At a general level, prudential regulatory regimes attempt to moderate
instability by requiring minimum liquidity and equity capital requirements
as constraints on leverage in the event the value of assets is impaired.
Constraints on activities can also be used to ensure some stability of asset
value. In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been a concerted focus
by policymakers, as well as in the academic literature, on reform of
prudential regulatory regimes. Not surprisingly, the more radical reform
proposals, in the sense that they are focused on structural reform of
regulatory regimes, are found in the policy literature. 64 As Adair Turner
argues, 65 however, a significant problem shared by these proposals is their
inability to adequately address the underlying causes of financial instability
centered on asset mispricing and leverage while also sufficiently allowing
for the provision of valuable maturity and risk-transformation functions
demanded by households and businesses. He emphasizes that the challenge
for policymakers remains striking a suitable balance between constraining
the sources of financial instability while allowing the provision of valuable
credit intermediation providing maturity and risk transformation. 66 In this
respect, the focus of policymakers has been not radical structural reform, 67
but incremental reforms of existing regulatory structures, including
increased levels of liquidity and capital, adoption or refinement of
Id. (highlighting the combination of credit intermediation and the trading function
investment banks perform by securitizing subprime mortgages as the source of the financial
crisis).
6 See, e.g., JOHN KAY, NARROW BANKING: THE REFORM OF BANKING REGULATION
(2009) (proposing a system of "narrow banking," which would involve removal of retail
deposit taking from the credit intermediation function and provision of this function by
financial firms competing in an unregulated market for uninsured wholesale funds);
63

LAURENCE

J. KOTLIKOFF,

JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD:

ENDING

THE WORLD'S ONGOING

FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING (2010) (proposing a system of mutual

lending in which mutual loan funds perform the credit intermediation function, with
investors sharing in returns as fund holders). Another structural reform proposal for
separation of commercial lending and proprietary trading is commonly associated with the
former Federal Reserve Bank chairman, Paul Volcker.
65 Turner, supra note 13, at 58-61.
66 Id at 61-62.
67 Of the structural reform proposals on offer, only "the Volcker rule" has been
adopted. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Ill203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
68 See, e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (June 2011);
BASEL COMMITTEE

ON

BANKING SUPERVISION,

AN

ASSESSMENT

OF THE

LONG-TERM
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resolution regimes, 69 and the development of macro-prudential tools. 7 0
It is unclear what role corrective taxation can, or is supposed to serve in
supporting prudential regulation - either in its existing form or a radically
reformed structure - as a policy instrument intended to provide a desirable
level of resiliency in the financial sector. In the standard public finance
analytical framework, prudential regulation is clearly the preferred policy
instrument over corrective taxation understood in the sense of the attempt to
force market participants to internalize the full costs of their activities in
either production or consumption. The case for the use of a corrective tax is
simply the observation that, under certain conditions, a corrective tax can
induce a desired reduction in social costs attributable to an activity at the
lowest private marginal cost for market participants. 7 1 Some of the relevant
conditions include the following 72 :
* the ability to quantify social marginal costs on a present-value basis
in order to calibrate the amount of the corrective tax necessary to
realize the desired reduction in the activity generating the costs;
* the presence of different cost structures for market participants such
that some market participants can avoid paying the tax by adopting
lower cost methods of avoidance, while other market participants must
pay the tax to the point that private marginal costs are equated with
social marginal costs;
* a linear relationship between an increase in the relevant activity and
the imposition of additional social costs; and

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STRONGER CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS (Aug. 2010). But

see Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive (Rock Cen. for Corp. Governance at Stanford
Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1669704 (arguing
that bank equity is not socially expensive and significantly higher equity requirements
should be imposed).
69 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 7-8.
70 See, e.g., TOBIAS ADRIAN & MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,

STAFF REPORT No. 348: CoVAR (2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1269446;
PAUL JENKINS & GORDON THIESSEN, C.D. HOWE INSTITUTE, REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR
FUTURE FINANCIAL CRISES: A FRAMEWORK FOR MACRO-PRUDENTIAL

POLICY IN CANADA

(2012); Caruana, supra note 23.
71 The seminal paper modelling the choice between regulation and corrective taxation
is Martin L. Weitzman, Prices Versus Quantities,41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974).
72 See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 134-46 (4th ed.

2012).
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* the presence of social marginal costs that increase in modest
incremental amounts with increases in the relevant activity.
In performing its necessary functions, the financial sector arguably
operates under none of these conditions. The social costs attributable to the
insolvency of a financial firm are exceedingly difficult to quantify and
virtually impossible to quantify in the event of a financial crisis involving
multiple firm failures. At least in terms of the various subsectors of the
financial sector performing different functions, the cost structures tend to be
homogenous, with this pattern appearing in firms operating across different
functions. The relationship between an increase in social marginal costs and
risk-taking behavior by financial institutions is decidedly nonlinear. At
some point that is difficult to define with any precision, the level of risktaking goes from the imposition of only potential social costs to the
imposition of actual costs as an institution becomes insolvent,73 with this
"cliff-effect" relationship resulting in the imposition of traumatic social
costs in the event of a financial crisis with multiple failures. 74
Given that the financial sector operates under these conditions, the case
for corrective taxation as the policy instrument of choice to moderate
financial instability is problematic. 7 5 Moreover, the dominant position of
prudential regulatory regimes means that, for all practical purposes, any
debate over the choice of policy instrument is closed. Indeed, until the latest
financial crisis, there really was no discussion in the public finance
literature of the use of corrective taxes to moderate financial instability. 76
Yet special taxes on the financial sector can have normative significance

See, e.g., Andrew Haldane, Regulation or Prohibition: The $100 Billion Question, 2
J. REG. & RISK N. AsIA 101, 106-16 (2010) (reviewing major changes to regulatory regime
in the United States and suggesting that regulation of the financial sector is preferable to
corrective taxation because the social marginal cost curve is likely steeper than the private
7

marginal cost curve); see also INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 53 (observing

that the nonlinear nature of financial stress suggests that hard limits on leverage and/or the
prohibition of certain activities be used to moderate financial instability).
74 See Keen, supra note 8, at 12-13 (observing that the expected social costs are a
function of the probability of financial institution failure and the wider economic costs
associated with such failure if unmitigated).
7 But see Devereux, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasizing that although a corrective tax
can be imposed using a nonlinear schedule, it is necessary to divide the aggregate marginal
benefit among banks to derive the appropriate schedule and it is difficult to implement a tax
in which each bank faces a different tax rate).
76 See Shackelford et al., supra note 8, at 782 (emphasizing the difficulties in the
design of Pigovian taxes as a means to address systemic risk in the financial sector); see also
Keen, supra note 8, at 2-5 (noting the lack of public finance literature on the taxation of the
financial sector).
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independent of prudential regulatory regimes without any attempt to
quantify the social marginal harm attributable to excessive risk taking and
impose a tax equal to that harm in an effort to equate private and social
marginal costs. One possibility is the use of a tax instrument to fill a gap in
prudential regulatory regimes or otherwise perform a supporting role by
inducing a behavioral response that moderates financial instability. Another
possibility is the raising of revenue from the financial sector to avoid the
distributional consequences of the income transfer that occurs when
government bails the sector out to avoid its liquidation. As suggested in the
following sub-part, it is somewhat unsurprising that bank leverage taxes
have emerged as the dominant tax instrument when framed in terms of
these possible justifications.
B. Bank Leverage Taxes and Taxation ofReturns to Risk Taking
There are arguably two different strands in the post-crisis tax literature
using the concept of corrective taxation in a much looser sense of a tax
intended to induce a desired behavioral response. One strand of this postcrisis literature emphasizes the possible amplifying effects on the build up
to the crisis of certain structural features of the income tax system, such as
the inconsistent treatment of corporate debt and equity, the deduction of
home mortgage interest, and a capital gains preference, as well as exempt
treatment of financial services under value-added tax (VAT) systems.7 The
lack of any empirical evidence of the relationship between these structural
features and the sources of financial instability,7 8 however, means that the
standard inefficiencies commonly associated with these features remain the
principal policy imperative for reform. The crisis can be seen to have
provided an opportunity to view these features from a new perspective that,
at best, can add to the case for reform.
Another strand of the same literature emphasizes the revenue-raising
capacity of special taxes on the financial sector as a means to fund the
public costs of bailouts in the event of failure. These taxes are also seen as
instruments to induce a desired behavioral response in the form of a

n See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 57; Michael Keen et al., Tax and the
Crisis, 31 FISCAL STUD. 43 (2010); see also Daniel Shaviro, Income Tax Reform
Implications, in TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 3, at 175 (emphasizing the
need for tax rules to avoid behavioral responses that exacerbate the causes of financial
crises).
78 But see Michael Keen & Ruud de Mooij, Debt, Taxes, and Banks (Int'l Mon. Fund,
Working Paper No. 12/48, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2012/
wpl248.pdf (finding from bank panel data for the period 2001-2009 that bank capital
structure is about as responsive to taxes as those of nonfinancial firms).
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reduction in leverage attributable to an increase in its tax price. In effect,
taxing debt of financial institutions arguably has the desirable secondary
effect of offsetting a generalized income tax bias in favor of debt and, by
reducing leverage levels, reducing associated risk taking. 79 As noted
previously, a bank leverage tax applied to wholesale liabilities80 of financial
institutions is the apparent instrument of choice for policymakers post crisis
to realize both revenue-raising and leverage-reduction goals.81 In extending
the application of such a tax beyond retail deposit insurance, which is
intended to limit the social costs of liquidity crises in the form of bank
runs, 82 policymakers presumably recognize that prudential regulatory
regimes are imperfect and cannot be expected to eliminate the occurrence of
either individual institution or sector-wide insolvencies. 83 In particular, a
balance must be struck between ensuring complete stability of the financial
7 See, e.g., de Mooij et al., supra note 3, at 19-20 (estimating that a bank leverage tax
applied at a rate of ten basis points would yield modest welfare gains associated with a
reduction in bank leverage and probability of crisis, although such gains would be
considerable at high levels of tax responsiveness at high initial leverage levels of ninety-six
percent of assets). But see Michael Devereux et al., Discussion at the CESifo Area
Conference on Public Sector Economics, Can Taxes Tame the Banks? Capital Structure
Responses to the Post-Crisis Bank Levies (Apr. 13, 2013), available at http:// www.cesifogroup. de/ portal/ page/ portal/ CFP CONF/ CFP CONF_2013/ Conf-psel3-Van%20der%
20Ploeg/ Papers/ psel3_Johannesen.pdf (finding, for a data set of 5000 banks in the
European Union in the period 2008-2011, that bank leverage taxes increased equity-asset
ratios by one to one and one-half percentage points but that the riskiness of bank assets also
increased).
80 A financial transactions tax (FTT) focused on financial transactions such as
commodity and securities trades can also serve a comparable function, although a bank
leverage tax on wholesale liabilities may be seen as more effectively targeted on leverage as
a source of instability. Moreover, an FTT tends to be justified in terms of the behavioral
response it is intended to induce: that is, excessive trading and the consequent destabilizing
effects of excessive volatility in a targeted market. A prominent post-crisis example of an
FTT is the FTT proposed by the European Union. See Commission Proposalfor a Council
Directive on a Common System of Financial Transaction Tax and Amending Directive
2008/7/EC, SEC (2011) 1103 final (Sept. 28, 2011).
81 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 6-16; sources cited supra

note 6.
82 But see Keen, supra note 8, at II (suggesting that retail deposit insurance can also
be justified as a way to correct for excessive risk taking and, in doing so, requires a charge
that raises the expected value of the amount needed to restore depositors in the event of bank
failure).
83 See GORTON, supra note 59, at 151-64 (emphasizing the inadequacy of bank capital
requirements in mitigating or preventing financial crises); see also Piergiorgio Alessandri &
Andrew G. Haldane, Banking on the State 2 (Nov. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/
2009/speech409.pdf (observing that the social contract between banks and the state is
incomplete which results in a time-inconsistency problem for authorities).
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sector and managing instability in order to allow the financial sector to
deliver an adequate range of services that enhance welfare and facilitate
economic growth. That balance may be defensibly shifted toward tighter
regulation in the context of developed economies where the link to
economic growth is not as clear as in developing economies, and there is
therefore an element of financial activity that is wasteful. 8 4 Even then,
however, an element of instability must be tolerated in order to avoid
unduly constraining the financial sector in its performance of necessary
functions. The simple notion is to accumulate a fund that can be used to
absorb the public costs of rescue in the same manner as general insurance.
In this sense, an insurance levy can be seen as an attempt to contain the
public costs of rescue by forcing the financial sector to self-fund while
supporting the prudential regulatory regime in the event of its failure.
A bank leverage tax imposed on wholesale liabilities can be justified,
therefore, as performing an insurance function, with leverage as the proxy
for risk taking. It may also serve as a corrective tax, in the sense used in the
public finance literature, if average and marginal social damage attributable
to risk taking by financial institutions are equivalent. 85 Any behavioral
response in the form of a reduction in the level of leverage of financial
firms and associated instability is entirely incidental. The goal is to ensure
that premiums and any investment income earned on the accumulated fund
equal the expected benefit of payment on the occurrence of the insured
event. 86 Indeed, it is unknown what the extent of any behavioral response
would be and therefore to what extent instability would be moderated
without unduly constraining financial activities that deliver value added. 87
84 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 13, at 30-37 (citing studies finding a correlation

between the growth of basic financial services and economic growth but questioning whether
the same relationship holds where continued financial deepening occurs beyond a level of
financial maturity characteristic of developed economies); see also Stephen G. Cecchetti &
Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth (BIS Working Papers No.
381, 2012) (finding that financial development impedes growth once it reaches a certain
level).
85 Keen, supra note 8, at 10-11 (observing that a user charge and a corrective tax have
a similar effect where the technical structure of an externality is such that average and
marginal damage are the same, with revenue raised by the tax exactly covering the damage).
86 Id at I I (suggesting that a mismatch in premium payments and expected benefits
will induce a behavioral response and it should be "intrinsically desirable").
87 But see Carmen Matutes & Xavier Vives, Imperfect Competition, Risk Taking, and
Regulation in Banking, 44 EURO. EcoN. STUD. 1 (2000) (illustrating how actuarially
appropriate deposit insurance can reduce risk taking when bank regulators can observe the
positions of regulated banks). There is a deep literature on the design of FTTs as a policy
instrument to dampen excessive volatility in commodities and securities markets. See
Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence 144 (Int'l Mon.
Fund, Working Paper No. 11/54, 2011); see also Daniel Shaviro, The FinancialTransactions
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More importantly perhaps, the determination of an actuarially appropriate
levy at both the individual institution level and sector wide presents a
significant problem with the design of a bank leverage tax as an insurance
levy. The amount of the levy can be determined most simply as a fixed
percentage of wholesale liabilities as the specified base. Under this
simplified approach, however, a segment of insureds with a lower risk
profile subsidize those with a higher risk profile. The alternative is to
calibrate the levy at the institution level to realize a separating equilibrium
among insureds. This approach is exceedingly complex and requires an
assessment of the systemic importance of individual institutions.88
It is not clear that determining an actuarially appropriate levy at the
level of individual institutions matters all that much when risk of failure is
correlated among institutions and the event requiring funding is multiple
failures and the potential liquidation of the financial sector.8 9 In fact, the
extension of retail deposit insurance through a bank leverage tax on
wholesale liabilities is probably most clearly conceived as an insurance levy
protecting against failure at the level of an individual financial institution in
an environment in which risk of failure is uncorrelated among institutions,
where policymakers can abstract from a necessary accounting for systemic
risk. If instead the goal is raising sufficient revenue to avoid liquidation of
the financial system, the revenue target must necessarily be limited to the
direct fiscal costs of bailout: the wealth transfer that would otherwise be

Tax vs. The FinancialActivities Tax, in TAXING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, supra note 6, at 165,

195-97 (suggesting that an FTT can be effective in addressing wasteful over-investment in
trading activity, but emphasizing that there is considerable uncertainty whether a FTT
realizes social benefits that exceed the social costs); Thomas Hemmelgarn & Gaetan
Nicodeme, The 2008 Financial Crisis and Taxation Policy 27-35 (CESifo Grp., Working
Paper No. 2932, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract =1546973 (concluding that the
effects of a FTT on asset price bubbles are ambiguous and preferring elimination of the
preferential treatment of debt as a more promising means to avoid excessive leverage and
risk taking).
88 See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Systemic Risk, in RESTORING
FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 51, at 283 (proposing the use of a capital charge as a

corrective tax capturing the marginal contribution of individual financial institutions to
system-wide risk). A bank leverage tax might also be calibrated to account for systemic risk
attributable to maturity mismatch. See Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, Liquidity Risk
Chargesas a Macro-prudentialTool, 40 CEN. FOR ECON. POL'Y RES. POL'Y INSIGHT 1 (Nov.
2009).
89 Keen, supra note 8, at 17 (suggesting that "public buffers" can have a useful riskpooling role when shocks are not strongly (or are negatively) correlated, in which case
taxation can economize on the reserves needed to deal with institutional failure, but "private
buffers" provided by regulation leave institutions better placed to deal with shocks that are
strongly positively correlated across institutions).
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made from taxpayers to the financial sector to avoid its liquidation. 90 The
magnitude of output losses attributable to a financial crisis would arguably
require imposition of an insurance levy in an amount that would eliminate
profits and would itself liquidate the financial sector. 9 1 One alternative is to
conceive of the insurance levy as intended to prevent bank runs by
wholesale lenders, similar to retail deposit insurance. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of exposure in the event of a sector-wide solvency crisis also
makes the necessary premia for such coverage unrealistic. 92 The
government's general revenue-raising function is thus required to provide
sufficient funding to address the full social costs of a financial crisis.
The modest rates at which bank leverage taxes have been enacted by
many countries post crisis 93 suggest that these taxes are seen as a means to
require the financial sector to pay for the direct fiscal costs of bailouts either
in advance or after-the-fact, 94 while suppressing, to some indeterminate
extent, the use of leverage and associated risk taking in the former case. As
emphasized in some of the post-crisis literature, 95 however, bank leverage
taxes can also serve a much different role as a corrective tax. More
particularly, the application of a bank leverage tax can be limited to TBTF
institutions and applied at a rate that equals the borrowing subsidy
attributable to implicit government support. This alternative framing is
defensible as an attempt to eliminate the subsidy with an emphasis on the
associated behavioral response that, in the loose sense used in some of the
post-crisis literature, is a form of corrective taxation. In fact, this policy
justification may be the closest form of corrective tax in the tighter sense of
90 Revenue raised could include an amount necessary for the funding of a resolution
mechanism. See INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 7, 14-15 (noting that
adoption of improved and effective resolution regimes requires funding that should come
from the financial sector through some form of charge and considering whether the proceeds
of such a charge should be used to finance a resolution fund or feed into general revenues).
91 See, e.g., Haldane, supra note 73, at 102-03.
92 Keen, supra note 8, at 15 n.33 (noting the difficulty of setting appropriate risk
premia in the face of the sheer magnitude of the exposure of an insurance scheme for
wholesale bank liabilities intended to prevent runs in the same way as retail deposit
insurance).
93 See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 6, at 206 (observing that the top rates of bank
leverage taxes in practice are low relative to estimates of the "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF)
subsidy).
94 The FCR fee is designed as an ex post levy intended to recover direct fiscal costs.

See INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 15-16 (stating a preference for ex ante

levies designed to cover the expected costs of future bailouts because ex post levies impose a
burden only on surviving institutions and are pro-cyclical, requiring the financial sector to
meet costs when it is least able to do so).
9 See, e.g., id. at 12, 54-59; Keen, supra note 8, at 12-15 (distinguishing the "failure
externality" from the "bailout externality").
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the term used in the public finance literature even though the amount of the
subsidy 9 6 and the offsetting amount of the tax does not equal the social
damage attributable to additional financial activity because of the
availability of cheap debt. The connection between the amount of the tax
and the social damage is instead an indirect connection with the elimination
of the subsidy by the tax resulting in a reduction in social damage
attributable to it. By setting the tax rate at an amount equal to the subsidy,
government effectively collects a fee for provision of its implicit guarantee
as established by the bond market and thereby increases private costs to an
appropriate risk-adjusted market rate. The resulting reduction in financial
services provided by TBTF institutions may have an impact on what might
otherwise be considered excessive risk taking and complement prudential
regulatory regimes in moderating financial instability. It should also help to
address distortions to competition and the possible over-supply of financial
services by a bloated financial sector.
Irrespective of the particular justification, bank leverage taxes present a
number of second-order design issues, none of which appear to be
insurmountable. 97 Determination of both the rate and the scope of a bank
leverage tax intended to eliminate the TBTF subsidy is admittedly more
problematic than when the tax is intended to recover expected direct fiscal
costs of bailouts. Estimates of the amount of the subsidy and the rate
required to eliminate it vary empirically. 98 In terms of the scope of the tax,
some form of an asset-based test must be used as a proxy for TBTF status
rather than broadly applying the tax to the financial sector on the premise
that all institutions benefit from government intervention in the event of a

96 Keen, supra note 8, at I 1-15.
97 See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 6, at 205-09 (discussing, for example: (1) the need
to extend bank leverage taxes to account for the implicit leverage in the derivatives
portfolios of financial institutions; (2) the deductibility status of bank leverage taxes for
corporate income tax purposes; and (3) coordination of tax jurisdiction to avoid double
taxation of cross-border financial institutions).
98 See INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 54-55; Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice

Weder di Mauro, The Value of the Too-big-to-fail Subsidy to Financial Institutions, in
FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION, supra note 5, at 106 (concluding that the funding advantage

from the TBTF subsidy is ten to fifty basis points and averaging around twenty basis points).
But see Haldane, supra note 73, at 104-05 (citing various estimates of the annual value of
the TBTF subsidy, including: (1) $60 billion at the height of the crisis for the five largest
global banks; (2) $34 billion for the eighteen largest U.S. banks; and (3) £30 billion for the
five largest U.K. banks); Keen, supra note 8, at 14 (noting that a corrective tax case for
elimination of the TBTF subsidy requires elimination of the subsidy at the margin which is
higher than the average cost of the externality because of the increase in the benchmark "no
intervention" borrowing rate at the margin and suggesting that "it is not difficult to arrive at
a corrective tax on wholesale borrowing in the order of 50 basis points.").
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crisis. 99 Perhaps because of the different rate and scope features, there is a
tendency to frame a bank leverage tax as intended either to cover the direct
fiscal costs of bailouts or to eliminate the TBTF borrowing subsidy. It is
relatively obvious, however, that a bank leverage tax could be designed to
realize both purposes. On the plausible empirical assumption that the rate
required to eliminate the TBTF subsidy would be greater than the general
rate payable by all financial institutions, TBTF institutions could be
permitted to credit the amount of the tax payable at the higher rate against
their general liability at the lower rate.
With adoption of a comprehensive bank leverage tax designed to
recover the direct fiscal costs of bailouts as well as eliminate the TBTF
borrowing subsidy, other tax bases would seem to be required, at least in
terms of revenue generation, only if policymakers were inclined to require
the financial sector to pay for the full social costs of bailouts and, in
particular, consequent output losses.10 0 In that case, a bank leverage tax
provides too narrow a base to generate the required revenue at a rate that
would not otherwise force the financial sector into the all-equity mutuallending structure Laurence Kotlikoff advocates' 0 ' and thereby generate no
revenue because of the prohibitive cost of debt. The revenue target is illdefined, however, since, as noted previously, 102 full compensation by the
financial sector for output losses would require a tax or insurance levy of a
magnitude that would itself liquidate the financial sector. As an instrument
intended to compensate for expected output losses associated with financial
crises, the justification for other possible bases thus moves away from the
determination of an actuarially appropriate insurance levy or a tax intended
to induce a behavioral response that moderates financial instability. The
attempt is to require a contribution by the financial sector that goes beyond
reimbursement of the inevitable income transfers in the event of a financial
crisis, but can similarly be seen to have desirable distributional properties in
the sense that the tax compensates, but only in part, for the social harm of
output losses. In this respect, taxation of returns to risk taking in the
financial sector has emerged in the literature as a possible base in addition

99 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 11-12.
1oo Id. at 16-23; Matheson, supra note 6, at 208-09 (arguing that a bank leverage tax
may be a better instrument for behavior modification than for significant revenue-raising,
with preliminary calculations indicating that such a tax imposed at a twenty basis point rate
on nondeposit debt of banks would raise approximately E28.5 billion in the Eurozone, £4.3
billion in the United Kingdom, and $5.1 billion in the United States).
See KOTLIKOFF, supra note 64.
102 See INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5; supra note 90 and accompanying
10

text.
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to a bank leverage tax. 103
It is a well-known insight of the tax-policy literature that imputing
interest expense on equity and providing a deduction at the corporate level
consistent with the treatment of debt while not taxing such returns to
investors can exempt normal returns to capital. Moreover, imputing interest
expense on equity at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate can also exempt risk
premia for the bearing of undiversifiable market risk (beta). The tax base
thus becomes supernormal or excess returns (alpha) to risk taking as well as
economic rents attributable to market power. The standard rationale for the
articulation of such a tax base is to equate the tax treatment of debt and
equity while treating normal and risk-adjusted returns consistent with a
consumption tax in order to avoid the deadweight loss attributable to the
behavioral response in the presence of the taxation of these returns. 104
Supernormal returns to risk taking remain taxable on the empirical
assumption that there is no behavioral response in the presence of taxable
treatment. The notion in the post-crisis literature, however, is to apply
taxation of supernormal returns to risk taking exclusively in the financial
sector as a tax base in addition to the income tax and the VAT.'os In the
case of the latter, the additional tax base would provide a measure of
taxation of value added by the financial sector in the aggregate at the firm
level and could be seen to offset exempt treatment of margin-based
financial charges under a transactional invoice/credit VAT.
In terms of revenue-raising capacity, returns to risk taking and
economic rents clearly provide a larger revenue base than a bank leverage
tax, 106 but at the cost of a weaker behavioral response that the tax-policy
literature emphasizes as the principal attraction of a tax base limited to

103 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 19-23.

104This is the standard rationale for a corporate cash-flow tax and, in particular, the
allowance for corporate equity system. This system was popularized in a study sponsored by
the U.K. Institute for Fiscal Studies. See INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES, EQUITY FOR COMPANIES:
A CORPORATION TAX FOR THE 1990s (1991).

10 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 65-69; Keen et al., supra
note 9, at 122-26, 130-37 (describing three forms of FATs differing in the definition of the
tax base as either (1) value added computed at the firm level by application of a subtraction
method value added tax (FAT 1); (2) economic rents equal to supernormal returns earned by
labor and shareholders (FAT 2); or (3) returns to excessive risk taking equal to supernormal
returns earned by labor and shareholders above a specified threshold (FAT 3)).
106 See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 67-69 (providing estimates

of revenue potential for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries of all three types of proposed FATs, see supra note 105); see also Shaviro, supra
note 87, at 176-78 (suggesting that an FAT is preferable to an FTT because it is a broader
net measure of financial activity).
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supernormal or excess returns. 10 7 Indeed, to the extent that this base is
focused on supernormal or excess returns with a tax rate at something less
than 100 percent, there will be no, or very little, behavioral response.10 8 The
presence of sustainable alpha associated with unique abilities, or false alpha
associated with asymmetric bets, will cause financial firms to pursue the
relevant investment and business strategies providing these forms of returns
to the extent there is a positive after-tax amount. Moreover, the lack of any
behavioral response at something less than a 100 percent tax rate would
likely persist even if loss recognition were denied.109 To induce a reduction
in risk taking, returns to undiversifiable risk, as well as supernormal returns,
could be taxed by imputing and exempting interest on equity at a riskless
rate. The reduction in risk taking, however, would be efficiency enhancing
only to the extent that it suppresses superfluous financial activity, and there
is no obvious way to distinguish such activity from the delivery of financial
services that provide value added in support of economic growth.110
Taxation of risk premia associated with undiversifiable market risk would
raise the cost of equity financing for financial firms and operate at crosspurposes with prudential regulatory regimes requiring maintenance of
specified capital ratios. Given these probable behavioral properties and an
imprecisely specified revenue target in the presence of a bank leverage tax,
it is perhaps not surprising that taxation of returns to risk taking in the
financial sector has not had any policy traction in practice.
C. An Excise Tax on Bonus and Performance-basedCompensation
Taxation of returns to risk taking has tended to focus on these returns
realized by equity investors, with the choice of interest imputation rate on
equity determining the extent to which risk premia are taxed. The

See, e.g., Devereux, supra note 8, at 24-25 (characterizing taxation of returns to risk
taking through an FAT as motivated by revenue generation concerns but with little or no
behavioral response in contrast with a bank leverage tax which is similarly motivated by
revenue generation concerns but also has a sharp behavioral response). But see Thomas
Hemmelgam & Gaetan Nicodeme, Can Tax Policy Help to Prevent FinancialCrisis?, in
TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 3, at 116, 125 (concluding that an FAT
would reduce the size of the financial sector by making financial services more expensive).
108 See, e.g., Matheson, supra note 6, at 211 ("Since these taxes [FATs] fall on financial
sector rents, their base should prove fairly inelastic except insofar as the tax is successful in
curbing excessive risk-taking.").
109But see Shaviro, supra note 87, at 186 (observing that limited loss recognition
provides asymmetric gain/loss tax rates and suggesting that it can suppress risk taking).
110See, e.g., Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 107, at 126 (noting that an FAT
cannot distinguish between high returns attributable to unduly risky behavior as opposed to
skills and effort).
107
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assumption underlying this focus is that rents are not earned by labor and all
wages and salary are therefore deductible in computing the tax base. This
assumption does not hold in the financial sector where, as described in Part
III, labor captures a substantial portion of rents. In this respect, it is again
descriptively correct to observe that rents captured by labor in the financial
sector, as well as rents captured by equity investors, can be taxed. This
result can be realized relatively easily by denying a deduction for
compensation in excess of a specified level.' 1 1 As with taxation of rents
captured by equity investors, however, there should be no behavioral
response to the extent that rents captured by labor are taxed at something
less than 100 percent. Nonetheless, taxation of these returns in particular
can be designed to realize a sharp behavioral response, provided the tax is
focused on the structure of compensation in the financial sector and not the
level of compensation. In effect, the tax can be designed to induce
compensation structures that mimic the payoff profile of equity investors by
ensuring that labor is exposed to loss of performance-based compensation
in the same manner as equity investors are exposed to the loss of invested
capital.
One of the reform themes in the post-crisis legal and economic
literature is the need to address the structure of bonus or performance-based
compensation in the financial sector, which can be seen to have encouraged
excessive risk taking in the form of placing asymmetric bets generating
option-like payoffs that for some time appeared to be rents but were
revealed by the crisis to be false alpha. Two structural reform ideas can be
indentified in this literature. One idea, advocated by Lucian Bebchuk and
Holger Spamann, would require linking an element of bonus or
performance-based compensation with the value of the interests of debt
holders and fixed participating equity holders (e.g., preferred
shareholders). 112 This type of link would broadly align the incentives of
labor with other stakeholders who do not benefit from option-like payoff
profiles and thereby would suppress, to some extent at least, the incentive to
otherwise place asymmetric bets with firm assets to the benefit of labor and
fully-participating equity investors (common shareholders). The other

II

See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF, supra note 5, at 68 (suggesting an

exemption level for compensation based on the empirical estimate of rents provided by
Thomas Philippon and Ariell Resheff, supra note 31).
112 Lucian A. Bebchuck & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 284 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuck et al., The Wages ofFailure: Executive Compensation
at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. REG. 257 (2010); see also PATRICK
BOLTON ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF NEW YORK, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND

RISK TAKING (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1635349 (finding that debt-like
compensation for bank executives is believed by the market to reduce risk).
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reform idea, proposed most prominently in a report by a group of leading
financial economists,1 1 3 would attempt to realize the same goal, but instead
by requiring that an element of bonus or performance-based compensation
earned in a year be set aside and be subject to claw back in the event of loss
occurring during a specified period.
Both reforms would obviously require considerable thought as to
second-order design details focused on, for example, the requisite weighting
of the interests of stakeholders other than common shareholders,114 or in the
case of claw back of compensation, the period over which exposure to claw
back would be considered adequate.11 5 Abstracting from those second-order
details, the expected dimension of any desirable behavioral response is an
important difference between the two proposals.11 6 Exposure to claw back
of bonus or performance-based compensation would provide payoff profiles
comparable to that of common shareholders. There would thus remain an
incentive for labor to place asymmetric bets, although that incentive would
not be as severe as it is when labor is not exposed to loss. In fact, an
element of such exposure is already realized to the extent executives receive
share compensation, and this compensation structure did not deter excessive
risk taking in the build up to the crisis.11 7 Bebchuck and Spamann's reform

113 KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL

75, 81-82 (2010) (recommending that "[s]ystemically important financial
institutions should withhold a significant share of each senior manager's total annual
compensation for several years.... [A]nd employees would forfeit their holdback if their
firm goes bankrupt or receives extraordinary government assistance."); see also Neil Record,
How to Make Bankers Share the Losses, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2010, at 9
(recommending unlimited liability of bank executives in respect of bonus compensation).
114 Bebchuck & Spamann, supra note 112, at 282-86.
115 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 234-35 (describing regulatory requirements for
system of claw back of compensation).
116 See Clementi et al., supra note 51, at 213 (noting that use of compensation claw
backs has been criticized for its potential unintended negative consequences, such as the
incentive it provides for traders to hide losses or to avoid any type of risky trading strategy
and become unduly conservative).
117 See Bebchuck & Spamann, supra note 112, at 255-65 (emphasizing that the
combination of equity-based compensation and bank capital structure provides executives
with an incentive to place highly levered bets on assets that is not eliminated by measures to
more closely align executive compensation arrangements with the interests of common
shareholders); see also FRENCH ET AL., supra note 113, at 82 (recommending that a holdback
of a fixed amount of compensation include deferred compensation in the form of restricted
stock or stock options since such compensation aligns the interest of executives with
common shareholders by permitting "both [to] capture the upside when things go well, and
transfer at least some of the losses to taxpayers when things go badly."); Bebchuck et al.,
supra note 112, at 261-70 (emphasizing the cash out of large amounts of bonus
compensation by executives of Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers during the period 2000SYSTEM
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proposal would avoid this effect to the extent that compensation is
dependent on the value of interests of stakeholders other than common
shareholders.1 8 Yet its proposed application appears to be limited to the
highest levels of financial firm management, perhaps because the
complexity of designing a compensation structure tied to the interests of
stakeholders other than common shareholders is seen to be worthwhile only
for key decision makers. Because of greater simplicity in second-order
design details, 119 a claw-back mechanism would probably be much easier to
apply through the entire ranks of a financial institution, which include
traders and other front office personnel who also have considerable decision
leverage in the use of firm assets. 120
These two proposed reforms to the structure of compensation in the
financial sector are not mutually exclusive and they could be implemented
as part of prudential regulatory regimes. Taxation of bonus and
performance-based compensation intended to encourage adoption of
compensation structures with either or both of these suggested features
would be required only where they are not incorporated as part of prudential
regulatory regimes and are left to market practice. 12 1 Bebchuck and
2008); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Bank Executive Compensation and Capital
Requirements Reform (May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract-17813 18 (recommending that (1) incentive compensation for senior bank
executives should consist exclusively of shares and/or share options that cannot be sold or
exercised for two to four years after leaving office; and (2) bank capital requirements should
be increased considerably for equity-based incentives to be effective).
118 But see Anat R. Admati & Paul C. Pfleiderer,Increased-liabilityEquity: A Proposal
to Improve CapitalRegulation ofLarge FinancialInstitutions (Stanford University Graduate
School of Business Research Paper No. 2043, Mar. 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1532484 (proposing an "Equity Liability
Carrier" that holds safe assets and thereby reduces fragility while alleviating distortions
attributable to conflicts of interest between debt and equity holders).
119 A claw-back requirement uniquely requires specification of a trigger event. See, e.g.,
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 113, at 83 (suggesting that trigger events should include extreme
events such as publicly-funded capital injections and unusual government guarantees as well
as less extreme events such as accessing lender-of-last-resort facilities available from a
central banking authority).
120 See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 12, at 242 (suggesting that "regulators would also have a
say in the remuneration structures of the non-key decision makers in the firm.").
121 See Clementi et al., supra note 51, at 210-13 (recommending compensation of
traders "through the cycle" to account for good and bad times but apparently assuming that
market practice would realize this result); Goodhart, supra note 56, at 171 (observing that
the case for claw back of compensation rests on public perception of what is "ethically
appropriate" rather than empirical evidence that existing compensation structures led bank
executives to consciously take risks knowing that a substantial portion of any losses would
be socialized); see also Liz Moyer, Banks Bow to New York on Clawbacks, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 2013, at C3; Jennifer Liberto, 'Likely' JP Morgan Clawbacks Rare on Wall Street,
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Spamann argue, for example, that existing regulatory regimes could
accommodate consideration of compensation structures in setting riskweighted capital requirements.12 2 Where regulatory regimes are incomplete,
a tax instrument could be used either as part of a tax base measuring returns
to risk in the form of rents or as a stand-alone tax. With either tax
instrument, compensation in excess of a specified level could be subject to
tax to the extent that it was not subject to a defined claw back or not
suitably weighted to account for interests of stakeholders other than
common shareholders. This type of tax would be preferable to a denial of a
deduction for income tax purposes at the employer level, primarily because
the rate could be set independently of the income tax rate of a particular
employer, and independently of the income tax rate faced by particular
employees. Experience with the denial of a deduction for compensation of
senior executives of public corporations in excess of $1 million would tend
to support the presence of a behavioral response in the form of a change in
the structure of targeted compensation. 123 It is not clear, however, what rate
should be used with an excise tax on bonus and performance-based
compensation where the purpose is to induce a reduction of risk taking to a
level that is socially optimal in the sense that private and social marginal
costs are equated. As with the choice between prudential regulatory regimes
and corrective taxation generally, the same informational constraint applies
equally, but a regulatory response may again be the preferable policy
instrument if the social marginal cost curve associated with excessive risk
taking is steeper than the private marginal cost curve.
To the extent that prudential regulatory regimes incorporate
requirements governing compensation and thereby serve the same function
as a tax instrument intended to alter the structure of compensation, 124 the

CNN MONEY (June 13, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/13/news/companies/
jp-morgan-clawbacks.
122Bebchuck & Spamann, supra note 112, at 278-86. But see Wolf, supra note 12, at
234-42 (assuming that a system of claw back of executive compensation would be the
subject of regulatory specification).
123 I.R.C. § 162(m). Introduced in 1993 by President Bill Clinton's Administration, the
deduction denial includes an exception for stock-based and other performance-based
compensation. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the exception is associated with some tax-driven
substitution of stock-based awards for the salary of executives of public corporations. See,
e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 14 TAX
POL'Y & ECON. 1 (2001).
124 See, e.g., 2013 O.J. L 176/338 (proposing limit on variable pay of 100 percent of
total fixed pay or 200 percent with shareholders' approval and requiring: (1) fifty percent of
variable pay to consist of shares or equivalent ownership interests; (2) three to five-year
deferral of forty percent of variable pay; and (3) exposure to claw back of up to 100 percent
of variable pay); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
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principal goal of a special tax on financial sector compensation becomes the
raising of revenue, and any desirable behavioral response should be seen as
entirely secondary because of the use of comparable regulatory
mandates. 125 This revenue-raising function could again be realized either as
part of a base intended to tax returns to risk taking by the financial sector or
as a stand-alone tax on bonus and performance-based compensation.1 26 As
with the taxation of returns to risk taking generally by the financial sector,
however, the revenue imperative is muted by the adoption of a bank
leverage tax. Moreover, the attempt to tax bonus and performance-based
compensation in particular is susceptible to shifting of key personnel in the
absence of a multilateral response. A tax on compensation in the financial
sector intended to alter compensation structures would, of course, be much
different in the articulation of the tax base and in its motivation than the
temporary bonus taxes introduced by the United Kingdom and France.
Because of the exception for the portion of compensation that is suitably
structured, such a tax might be able to be adopted unilaterally by a country
without undesirable shifting of its incidence or shifting of the location of
employees and/or operations. The United Kingdom and France acted
bilaterally to avoid the latter, 127 but the temporary nature of the tax appears
to have caused shifting of its economic incidence, with anecdotal evidence
that firms grossed up or otherwise altered compensation levels to protect
affected employees from the tax. 12 8 This practice might not be as prevalent
in the presence of a tax targeting compensation structures. Provided that
this type of tax applies across a wide range of financial sector personnel,
nontax factors dictating a presence in a country could tend to act as a more
effective binding constraint on tax-driven migration.

111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010) (requiring the Securities and Exchange
Commission to direct prohibition on listing of securities of issuers that have not developed
and implemented compensation claw backs).
125Devereux, supra note 8, at 21 ("If the tax and the regulation are perfectly in
alignment, then it seems likely that the tax would have no effect on behaviour beyond what
is required by regulation.").
126 As an example of a stand-alone excise tax, Italy has adopted a surtax of ten percent
on financial sector bonuses in excess of 300 percent of wages. See INT'L MONETARY FUND
STAFF, supra note 5, at 40.

127 See Doina Radulescu, The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and
Welfare (CESifo Grp., Working Paper No. 3030, Apr. 2010), availableat http://www.cesifogroup.de/DocDL/cesifolwp3030.pdf (finding that a bonus tax is borne by bank
shareholders where relocation possibilities exist but the results may be reversed where
relocation possibilities do not exist).
128 See Sara Schaefer Munoz et al., France Joins UK Bonus Tax;
Not Germany, US,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2009, at Cl; George Parker & Megan Murphy, UK Failsto Alter Bank
Bonus Culture, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 6, 2010, at 6.

428

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 33:393

V. CONCLUSION

This article considered three possible taxes on the financial sector post
crisis: bank leverage taxes, taxation of returns to risk taking, and an excise
tax on bonus and performance-based compensation. It was suggested that
the ability of bank leverage taxes to realize relatively modest revenue goals,
while potentially providing a desirable behavioral response, makes their use
as the tax instrument of choice of policymakers unsurprising. Given this
policy preference, the rejection of taxation of returns to risk taking in the
financial sector is similarly unsurprising. In the presence of bank leverage
taxes, adoption of this additional tax base must be motivated by revenue
generation concerns that are not as precisely quantifiable, and in the
absence of a clearer revenue imperative, its weak behavioral properties have
diminished its appeal. Although excise taxes on bonus and performancebased compensation have been largely disparaged in the literature as
politically motivated, a plausible case can be made for this base as an
instrument to alter the structure of compensation. The failure to adopt such
a tax may be attributable, in part at least, to redundancy where constraints
with similar intended effects can be imposed through regulatory regimes.

